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Abstract 
From the late 1970s when serious economic woes hit Nigerians in general and the 
inhabitants of Kaduna in particular, the latter began to seek explanations for the ills 
that beset their country and support to deal with them. Some found this in new 
religious movements, both Christian and Muslim, that rejected former 
sects/denominations as religiously and ethically unacceptable and focused on more 
modern, individualistic lifestyles as well as providing some measure of material 
support, explanations and solutions based in the supernatural for the ills the 
population was suffering. The situation sparked fear of social chaos, partly owing to 
men’s uneasiness at the threat of losing their dominance over wives and offspring 
along with their control of economic resources. The new religious movements 
support male superiority while offering greater space for women, provided they 
keep to their assigned places. These movements thus combine material and social 
support with the spiritual.  
Keywords 
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Introduction 
This paper explores how new forms of religion have been used by inhabitants of Kaduna,2 a 
city in the middle-belt region of northern Nigeria, capital of the state of that name, to support their 
adaptation to the socio-economic changes of the last few decades and, in particular, how this has 
aided the maintenance of social order, in tandem with the preservation of current ideals of 
masculinity, with its symbiotic relationship with religion.  
Nigeria’s economy is dominated almost entirely by petroleum, in relation to both exports and 
government revenues, making the country largely a rentier state (Falola and Heaton 2008). As such it 
has succumbed to the so-called Dutch disease, whereby selling large quantities of natural resources – 
in this case oil – increases the value of the currency, making it cheaper to import goods than to 
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produce them domestically and pricing exports out of the market. This has made it more profitable for 
elites to manipulate the political system in order to capture a share of the oil revenues than to 
establish their own enterprises or even to provide the infrastructure to make it economically viable for 
others to do so. The result has been high unemployment levels, especially in the north (Teal 2014).  
Poverty rates in Kaduna city have risen enough to threaten the fabric of society, exacerbated 
since early 2000 by episodes of sometimes quite major violence. While this is usually termed 
sectarian, since religious affiliation is the crucial element in delineating sides and recent decades have 
seen considerable faith-based militancy (Falola 1998), resentments arising from competition over oil 
revenues and the differential access to political power by the various ethnic groups have acted as 
catalysts for hostilities (Harris 2013).  
This has been exacerbated by the struggle to maintain a decent lifestyle resulting from the 
dearth of basic infrastructure - constant electricity, running water, good roads, schools, and medical 
establishments. This has made the operation of all sizes of business prohibitively expensive, and thus 
kept even informal employment low. Successive national governments have attempted to claim the 
moral high ground, to legitimise themselves through being seen to uphold positive values, in part by 
enforcing specific notions of decency (Marshall 2009: 103ff). Recent examples include an abortive bill 
that attempted to legislate for tight control over women’s dress and behaviour3 and the anti-
homosexuality bill signed into law in 2014. It has been suggested that the northern states introduced 
shari’a law starting in 1999 for the same reason. Thus, rather than improving material conditions, 
governments have preferred to focus attention on potential threats to the social order, most 
especially those relating to the preservation of ‘traditional’ and/or religiously sanctioned gender 
performances (cf. Tamale 2013).  
Since the 1970s, many inhabitants of Kaduna have abandoned the older Muslim Sufi and 
Christian missionary orders in favour of more recently founded religious establishments with 
messages more in line with current circumstances and enhanced capacity to satisfy both spiritual and 
material needs. These establishments provide support for the preservation of social stability, including 
by bolstering the position of men and upholding current ideals of masculinity.  
In this paper I suggest this has been inspired by the new ways offered by these establishments 
of developing the spiritual self as well as by explanations for, and some level of protection from, the 
malign forces feared to be the cause of the wider problems in Nigerian society (Marshall 2009). They 
also provide material support for the poorest in their congregations, while legitimising and 
institutionalising existing notions of masculine superiority, albeit with a contemporary twist, and 
simultaneously granting some level of recognition to women, producing a seemingly win-win 
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situation.  Thus, I argue, religion and ‘traditional’ masculine authority have been brought together to 
provide the bedrock for social stability in Kaduna today. 
The paper starts by expounding the fieldwork methodology on which it is based before 
presenting the conceptual framework, describing the setting of Kaduna and explaining relevant issues 
concerning religion and masculinity there. Finally, it analyses the contribution of the newer religious 
institutions to preserving social order and thus helping to ward off chaos. 
Methodology 
The data I draw upon come from accounts of missionary work in Africa and its effects (e.g. 
Labode 1993; Oyěwùmí 1997; Peel 1993, Prevost 2010), contemporary studies of the new religious 
movements especially Kane (2003), from which much of the background to Izala is taken, and 
Marshall (2009), and ﬁeldwork in Kaduna carried out between 2007 and 2011 in conjunction with a 
series of grass-roots community education projects in different neighbourhoods.4 The social analyses 
carried out by participants in these projects included gender as a significant element, the starting 
point being their identification of the norms of masculinity and femininity in their own communities. 
This formed the basis for discussions on how the norms of masculinity pressured men into certain 
kinds of often negative activities, such as domestic violence or street fighting. The participants 
comprised adult women aged between 20 and 60, most with little if any schooling, and youths aged 
between 15 and 35, the latter mainly but not solely male, all of whom had some schooling, and most 
of whom were either still in or had completed secondary school. Altogether, over 60 youths, forty 
Muslims and twenty Christians, and 80 women, about thirty of whom were Christians, participated in 
the projects.5 The Christians belonged to Anglican, Baptist and several different Pentecostal churches; 
while some Muslims belonged to Sufi orders, most followed the reform Izala movement, of which 
Kaduna is an important centre (Ben Amara 2011). 
I also worked with Anglican, Baptist and Pentecostal ministers as well as Izala Imams and 
helped form a committee of Muslim and Christian religious leaders, with the aim of improving mutual 
understanding and collectively seeking ways of addressing both the socio-economic difficulties of their 
congregants and the inter-religious hostility that has resulted in tensions all too often being released 
through violence.  
My approach is ethnographic, and I rarely carry out formal interviews, drawing for my data on 
discussions held during the education sessions, informal conversations with participants and the 
fathers of some project youths, as well as my encounters with religious and community leaders, both 
Christian and Muslim. I make no claims for the generalisability of the data presented in this paper to 
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the over 1.5 million inhabitants of Kaduna city (Bununu et al 2015) but rather describe the situation 
from the perspective of those with whom I worked there.  
Conceptual Framework  
Gender 
Gender is an analytical concept, not simply standing for women or even males and females 
but rather denoting power relations emanating from what formerly were categorised as a 
biomedically-based masculine superiority and feminine inferiority, translated into two clearly 
bounded identity positions (Oyěwùmí 1997: 32ff). The salience of gender is the pressure experienced 
by both sexes to live up to sets of norms established in their own families and communities; thus, it 
concerns power at the collective and not just the individual level (Harris 2004), based on male-
dominated structures that form an important element of governmentality. The norms must be 
performed since it is by their behaviour that people are recognised as meeting expectations. This is 
not to suggest the norms are mechanically reproduced but rather that individuals accommodate, 
negotiate and manage them as best they can. They are aided by what I have termed ‘gender masks’ - 
modes of self-presentation that can be used to mimic gendered expectations in order to present an 
appearance of conformity, irrespective of reality (Harris 2004).  
Gender is culturally and historically situated. The very notion of norms, along with the 
particular form taken by them in distinct cultural groups, is socio-politically constructed over time. The 
set of norms described in this paper has spread widely as a result of (neo)colonialism and globalising 
capitalism, the media and other influences, including religion, that have produced strong similarities in 
the construction of the norms  over much of the globe. Among the most crucial and persistent 
elements are the association of breadwinning with masculinity and domesticity with femininity, 
notions that developed largely in industrialising England in the nineteenth century (Rose 1986), 
although they feed into interpretations from elsewhere, such as Islam (Imam 1994). 
It has been suggested that prior to Christianisation and colonisation, in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
the lineage was viewed as more important than the individual (Oyěwùmí 1997; Shaw 2002). 
Moreover, among the Yoruba of south-western Nigeria, for instance, ‘social identity was relational and 
was not essentialized’ by being attached to specific bodies (Oyěwùmí 1997: xiii, 143). If all this is so, 
gender as defined above was an anachronistic concept in Sub-Saharan Africa and indeed the evidence 
on human relationships prior to cultural contact with the west would appear to substantiate this (Saidi 
2010).  
This does not mean male and female were undifferentiated. Historical research reveals both a 
sexual division of labour and culturally-based sets of appropriate behaviour patterns males and 
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females were expected to conform to. However, these were not differentially valued as they were in 
Europe (Amadiume 1987; Nzegwu 2006; Oyěwùmí 1997).  
Power relations were structured along lineage lines, with age and/or seniority playing an 
important part. Women were valued for both their reproductive and their productive roles. However, 
today to a varying extent depending on cultural setting, in public discourse at least, the influence of 
(neo)colonialism and Christianisation has meant women are likely to be deemed inferior (Tamale 
2013). Thus, while masculinity and femininity as currently constructed in Nigerian society are 
considered traditional, implying they derive from antiquity, in fact much of this was forged over the 
colonial and post-colonial periods, making this tradition relatively recent (Oyěwùmí 1997). 
 Religion versus rituals 
We tend to assume all cultural groupings had something that can be labelled religion since all 
had some form of relationship with the supernatural. In so doing we fail to interrogate the term 
religion and consider its scope. Talal Asad insists ‘there cannot be a definition of religion which is 
universally viable because and to the extent that the effects of these processes are historically 
produced, reproduced and transformed’ (1983: 238). Moreover, the very act of seeking a universal 
definition is suspect since it implies it will be based on Christian thought, which is unlikely to do justice 
to entities deriving from other cultures. Each setting needs to be studied from its own perspective 
(Asad 2001).  
There has been in Africa a tendency to buy into European notions of the superiority of 
monotheism and, in an attempt to refute suggestions of inferiority, to claim this for African ‘religions’, 
suggesting they contain similar elements to Christianity (cf. Mbiti 1969, 1970). The Acholi scholar Okot 
p’Bitek strongly criticised this on the grounds that it was a distortion of African culture. His book on his 
own setting insists the Acholi have no gods and their relationship with the supernatural focuses on 
propitiation not worship (p'Bitek 1971), thus coming closer to a cult than a religion (cf. Peel 2000).  
The aim of the propitiation is to prevent disturbances of the material and/or social order (for 
instance, by illness or other misfortunes) and restore stability in the here and now, not to lay up merit 
for an afterlife (p’Bitek 1971; Peel 1993). This is not peculiar to the Acholi but applies to other African 
cultures too, including the Gbagyi or Gwari peoples of central Nigeria, whose land originally included 
the area currently occupied by Kaduna city (Adedayo and Sanda 2011).  
The Hausa is the largest Muslim group in northern Nigeria. They continue to practise bori 
rituals, supposedly derived from the customs of unconverted Hausa or Maguzawa (Danfulani 1999). 
Research in central Nigeria suggests bori practitioners see this as complementary to Islam, insisting 
Allah created both the spirits that possess them and the ills they seek to cure. Bori continues to 
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flourish among some Nigerian Muslims mainly as a form of traditional healing often used by those too 
poor to afford to consult biomedical practitioners or where allopathic treatments have not worked, 
but also as a form of crisis management (Andersson 2002). 
The disturbances referred to above are often said to be caused by negative witchcraft or 
sorcery, which have historically been combated through the use of appropriate rituals, deriving from 
local cultures rather than world religions. For this reason Africans use different terminology for the 
two. The Acholi, for instance, use the Swahili loan word dini for Christianity and Islam as opposed to 
their local word for rituals (p’Bitek 1971). John Peel makes the same claim for the Nigerian Yoruba, 
stating that while they participated in specific local cults, these were deemed integral to their way of 
life and thus not conceptualised as ‘bounded entities’ in their own right. They only ‘recognize[d] 
themselves as having “a religion” when they adopt[ed] Islam or Christianity’, since ‘in the traditional 
cultures of western Africa, "religion” did not exist as an indigenous category, but was introduced by 
missionaries and taken up … by anthropologists to refer to certain cultural and behavioural aspects of 
the whole community’s functioning,’ even though these ‘customs of the country’, including orisa, 
were ontologically distinct from religion (Peel 1993: 89, 2000: 88-90). This does not exclude cross-
fertilisation between the two nor does it suggest the rituals/cults were or have ever been static (Shaw 
2002: 51, 77).  
The same claim is made for the knunu of the Gbagyi (Adedayo and Sanda 2011). Supposedly, 
for them one reason for religious conversion was to add an additional layer of protection from evil 
spirits. It might also have presented an opportunity to broaden this protection out from the local to a 
larger and thus more powerful community. However, even after conversion, traditional rituals 
continued to be practised, since prayer and other religious acts provided insufficient support to 
counter everyday negative forces. Most early conversions of the Gbagyi were to Islam - that is, to 
Sufism - no doubt facilitated by the similarity between some of the practices associated with the local 
orders and traditional rituals, including rainmaking and anti-witchcraft ceremonies (Adedayo and 
Sanda 2011; Andersson 2002; Kane 2003).  
The Christian missionary orders were categorically opposed to the concepts of the occult 
behind the rituals, seeing them as the devil’s work. Those proselytising among the Gbagyi thus refused 
to allow their converts to continue practising the rituals but without offering a substitute that might 
counter supernaturally caused ills. Nor did Christianity seem useful for evoking good spirits to provide 
adequate rainfall, or protection against illnesses, pests and diseases. Therefore, this religion only 
gradually took hold among the Gbagyi and knunu practices continued when circumstances required 
support of a kind unavailable from the missionary churches (Adedayo and Sanda 2011).  
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Consequently, although Muslim bori practitioners see their religion as compatible with their 
rituals and orisa and knunu are also practised alongside religion, they are viewed as occupying distinct 
spaces. Hence I refrain from conflating them, reserving the term religion for Christianity and Islam, 
and the terms cults and rituals to refer to various aspects of traditional African practices related to the 
supernatural. This is not intended to imply their inferiority but rather to distinguish the two 
analytically. I make no claims regarding modernity either, since both religions and the cults/rituals are 
historically bounded and thus inseparable from the particular time and place under study.  
Their conceptual separation does not make them incompatible. Some elements of the rituals 
were absorbed into Sufi practice, as stated above. In the hope of increasing their appeal, several 
mainline churches have deliberately adopted certain ritualistic elements (Larkin and Meyer 2006; 
Marshall 2009), while many neo-Pentecostals explain misfortune as an effect of malign spirits that 
only their particular church can overcome (Maxwell 1998).  
A further important distinction between religions and the cults and rituals is that the former 
are deeply implicated in the construction of gender norms. Although men and women frequently play 
different roles within traditional cults and rituals, these do not regulate gendered behaviour in the 
same way.. This may go some way to explain the fact that women are sometimes said to use 
traditional rituals to gain power denied them by religion (Danfulani 1999: 433). 
The setting6 
The British Protectorate of Nigeria was formed in 1914 by combining the Protectorates of 
northern and southern Nigeria. The former region is dominated by Hausa and Fulani. The latter 
consists of the south east, where the majority group is Igbo and mainly Catholic, and the south west, 
where the majority cultural grouping is Yoruba, around a third of whom have converted to Islam, the 
rest to Christianity (Falola and Heaton 2008).  
In 1960, when Nigeria gained independence, the south had long been economically dominant, 
largely because of its many schools, enabling it to deploy an educated population to occupy 
administrative and industrial positions; to compensate, the British allocated political power to the 
north. This institutionalised the north-south divide, conceptualised along ethno-religious lines created 
by British colonial officials that set the tone for its subsequent political history and prevented it from 
developing into a united nation-state (Kazah-Toure 2002).  
This has been a consequence of the original regional divisions along with the colonial practice 
of creating hard ethnic boundaries and spatially separating local from incoming populations. The 
country has been subdivided several times, currently consisting of a federation of 36 states, inhabited 
by some 250 cultural groupings. Each state may designate specific groups as ‘indigenes’, all others 
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being labelled ‘settlers’, irrespective of their actual length of time in the region. Settlers are excluded 
from state government employment and from equal opportunities for tertiary education; they have 
limited access to other amenities, such as land and university scholarships. This has effectively barred 
significant portions of the population from inclusive citizenship rights and contributed significantly to 
community violence (Harris 2013; Kraxberger 2005). 
Built in 1912 on land historically populated by the Gbagyi, Kaduna was designed by the British 
to function as the capital of the then Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. The British assumed the Gbagyi 
would not mind ceding the land since they had not fully settled it and they were angry at complaints 
regarding its appropriation. Consequently, not only did the Gbagyi receive no compensation, their 
claims were never even acknowledged, the British granting rulership rights solely to the Fulani Emir of 
Zaria. To this day these issues continue to fuel resentment; they have been a significant element in the 
episodes of sectarian violence that have plagued the city (Harris 2013). 
The Gbagyi living in and around Kaduna city south are now mostly Christian, those to the 
north Muslim (Adedayo and Sanda 2011; Gandu 2011). The remainder of the city’s population are 
Hausa-Fulani Muslims, the largest population group in northwestern Nigeria, and members of smaller 
groups from southern Kaduna state, as well as Igbo, Yoruba and other ethnicities from southern 
Nigeria. For the past few decades, the population of the city, as also of the state, has been relatively 
equally divided between the two religions (Harris 2013). 
Economic relations  
Oil was discovered in the Niger Delta in the late 1950s and became particularly important in 
the 1970s as a result of the OPEC price hikes that greatly increased the revenues from international 
sales, boosting the federal budget from three billion dollars in the early 1970s to some forty-five 
billion in 1980. This set Nigeria awash with money, much of which went to elites, who initiated a 
frenzy of importation of status-giving commodities that continued well into the 1980s, long after the 
rest of the population had been affected by austerity measures owing to the falls in global oil prices 
that started in 1981, accompanied by state mismanagement and corruption (Watts 1990: 38). The 
country as a whole had benefited little from the 1970s boom that had provided only minimal 
upgrading of urban infrastructures and almost totally neglected rural areas so agricultural production 
dropped drastically, from over 50 percent of GDP in 1970 to around 20 percent a decade later, while 
its share of exports reduced from more than 60 percent to just over two percent. As a consequence, 
rural employment fell from over 80 percent in the 1960s to around 50 percent in the 1980s, 
accompanied by a decline in real wages. This heightened rural poverty, greatly increasing rural-urban 
migration (Kane 2003: 43ff).  
9 
 
 
Formal employment opportunities were scarce. In the mid-1950s the International Labour 
Organisation’s estimates gave a national average of some 3.6 percent of adult men in waged 
employment in Nigeria. No more than two percent of waged workers were women, so this category 
was essentially male. In fact, during the colonial period since an important channel through which the 
British insisted on their superiority was the breadwinner norm complementing the domesticated 
femininity of their wives, Nigerian men were inspired to claim their own rights to a breadwinner 
identity and thus to a family wage. The colonial state, meanwhile, continued to operate based on the 
contradictory ideology that Nigerian men did not need as high wages as the British because their 
wives contributed significantly to household finances while making this as difficult as possible by 
denying women waged employment, on the grounds their place was in the home. The effect was to 
keep pay low while creating a masculinist ideology whereby men were expected to use their income 
to support the family but women were allowed to hold on to their own earnings except in cases of 
extreme family need (Lindsay 2007). 
After independence, the number of men working in formal waged labour remained low. In 
1975 it was estimated at 7.8 percent (Lindsay 2007) and it has barely grown since - in 2006 fewer than 
10 percent of the adult population were formally employed. Today, an additional almost 25 percent of 
the urban adult population is self-employed with some 25 percent of adults and over 50 percent of 
youths unemployed. The vast majority of the self-employed work in the informal sector, mostly doing 
odd jobs, day labouring and other low skilled and insecure work, not running the small enterprises the 
World Bank lauds as the future of the global economy. Incomes are variable but for most remain low, 
to the point that some of the least skilled apparently see little point in bothering to work at all as it 
does little to raise either their status (see below) or their income. Moreover, since 2000, agricultural 
family employment has been the only category to have registered a significant rise, the implication 
being that secondary and tertiary education are not paying dividends in the shape of improved 
employment/income opportunities. Both university and high-school graduates lack appropriate skills 
due to the significant falls in standards of the respective institutions (Teal 2014).  
It has become increasingly difficult for lower-skilled men anywhere in Nigeria to earn a decent 
living, one that truly allows them to provide for their family’s needs. In the north, where Kaduna is 
situated, the overall economy is doing considerably worse than the national average, with a 
corresponding effect on earning opportunities. The oil boom had seen Kaduna prosper as the centre 
of economic and political power in northern Nigeria, as well as of the textile industry. The fall in oil 
prices of the early 1980s greatly reduced government funding; this hit Kaduna hard and significantly 
reduced formal employment levels, leaving many men unable to support their families. Women had to 
attempt to fill the resultant spending gap (Coles 1991). After 1986 these economic woes were 
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exacerbated by additional falls in the oil price, together with the structural adjustment programme 
forced on Nigeria by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Falola and Heaton 2008), 
the negative consequences of which continue to resonate. Moving the national capital from Lagos to 
Abuja in 1991 eliminated much of Kaduna’s political importance, while the deterioration of the 
infrastructure resulting from the economic problems gradually forced the closure of most large textile 
factories (Andræ and Beckman 1998). 
Decades earlier, the need for skilled workers for these factories had enticed southern 
Nigerians to the city, greatly increasing the number of Igbo and Yoruba inhabitants. While the men 
found jobs in the larger plants, many of their womenfolk were employed in ancillary workshops. With 
the closing of the large enterprises these were unable to continue either, forcing entire families into 
the informal sector (Andræ and Beckman 1998; Meagher 2013). 
Little has improved since then, including the infrastructure. As long as they can access oil 
revenues, elites continue to lack incentives to establish major enterprises. The accepted route to 
these is via political office, which provides significant enough gains to warrant the use of violence to 
help win elections, as well as facilitating the corruption that has become endemic in this nation (Harris 
2013). 
Perhaps as a result, several serious episodes of violence have occurred in Kaduna State, 
allegedly as a consequence of elite power struggles.7 In the city the worst outbreaks were over the 
introduction of shari’a law in February and May 2000, over Nigeria’s hosting of the Miss World beauty 
pageant in November 2002, and in protest at the re-election of Goodluck Jonathan in April 2011, with 
total deaths in the thousands, many more wounded, and large numbers displaced. Besides the loss of 
life and limb, there was considerable destruction of property, which people received no compensation 
for, so that each successive outburst impoverished further segments of the population. This has been 
exacerbated by the fact that many people have decided mixed-religious neighbourhoods are unsafe. 
This has brought thousands of Christians to relocate south of the river running through the city, 
Muslims to shift north. One effect has been that many employees must now travel long distances to 
work, significantly increasing their financial, time, and stress burdens (Harris 2013).  
Christianity and Islam in northern Nigeria 
Islam arrived in what is now northern Nigeria well over a millennium ago, for centuries being 
mostly taken up by elites. The early nineteenth century witnessed the jihad of Usman Dan Fodio, 
essentially a crusade to rid Islam of local accretions, the influence of which is still being felt (Andersson 
2002), while missionaries only started spreading Christianity among the population at large in the late 
nineteenth century. The twentieth century saw the vast majority of the population convert, so that 
11 
 
 
today at least 95 percent of the Nigerian population claims adherence to one or other religion, often 
alongside the continued practice of elements of local rituals and cults noted above (Pew 2010). 
In the 1840s, Christian missionaries settled in the coastal regions, gradually moving inland. 
During their conversion efforts, they paid significant attention to inculcating European gender norms 
into their congregants, apparently conflating their own gender ideals with appropriate Christian 
behaviour (Oyěwùmí 1997: 128ff). Officially, missionaries were supposed to stay away from northern 
Nigeria, by agreement between the colonial administration and the emirs or rulers, and the majority 
of the local Hausa population converted to one of the two Sufi orders – the Qâdiriyya and the 
Tijâniyya – that dominated Nigerian Islam at the time (Falola and Heaton 2008).  
By the late twentieth century, a preponderance of the inhabitants of southern Nigeria, as also 
of the southern regions of the middle-belt states, including Kaduna, had converted to Christianity, 
mainly to a mission church or ECWA (the Evangelical Church of West Africa8) (Pew 2010). It was in this 
central region that the two religions met in relatively equal proportions. Perhaps not surprisingly 
these have been the arenas of the greatest sectarian unrest, exacerbated by the indigeneity laws 
(Kraxberger 2005). 
The government response to the oil boom-and-bust of the 1970s and 1980s acted as a catalyst 
for the dissatisfaction of the populace, particularly the more educated middle classes, prevented from 
moving up the social ladder and finding themselves instead sliding into poverty, due to the economic 
situation and the power of the elites, while taunted by the latter’s increase in conspicuous 
consumption. These feelings were exacerbated by the hierarchical character of Nigerian society, which 
kept young people and the lower classes in positions of servility despite some undermining of the 
social structures by nouveaux riches who had managed to grab some of the oil wealth for themselves.  
Several further factors influenced the situation. The first was the conviction that occult 
powers were ultimately responsible for this surge in wealth that appeared to lack a productive source. 
The second was the belief that the Sufi orders and established churches participated in state-related 
corruption. This was accompanied by resentment that these institutions were doing little to help their 
congregants deal with their difficult socio-economic situations and that they provided no support for 
confronting the causes. The third was the increasing feeling that a purely secular state would be 
unable to meet the people’s expectations, especially in terms of getting rid of corruption (Falola 1998; 
Kane 2003; Marshall 2009).  
The populace’s growing alienation from the state and mainstream religious establishments 
helped both Muslims and Christians view this as a crisis that could be met only by ‘recourse to 
supernatural means … as a technique or practice of power’ (Marshall 2009: 104). Among those most 
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strongly affected were young, educated, lower-class men whom the gerontocratically-based 
hierarchies of Nigerian society had tended to repress. Not only did they not belong to the elite but 
they were expected to follow the lifestyle ordained for them by parents and society. Hausa Muslims, 
for example, were required to kowtow not only to the elders but also to the Sufi Shaykhs whom they 
must beg to intercede for them in religious matters (Kane 2003). It was from student associations, 
Christian-based in the south, Muslim in the north, that the notion of establishing new religious 
institutions emerged. This was significantly affected by the 1977-78 debates in the Constitutional 
Assembly over introducing shari’a law in the north, as well as by transnational influences including 
new forms of Pentecostalism from the United States, the expansion of Saudi Arabian support to 
northern Nigerian Islam as a way to spend excess petro-dollars, and the Iranian Revolution. The 
outcome was new charismatic, mainly neo-Pentecostal, churches and a wave of reform Islamic and 
Islamist movements (Kane 2003; Marshall 2009).9  
The latter included the Umma, or ‘Shiites’, under their charismatic leader, Ibrahim El-Zakzaky, 
inspired and supported by the Islamic Republic of Iran, Maitatsine’s millenarian movement, and more 
recently the Islamist, Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal-Jihad, popularly known as Boko Haram, 
whose founder, Mohammed Yusuf, was killed by the state in 2009 (Ben Amara 2011). 
In this paper I focus almost entirely on the largest and most influential of the reformist 
movements, the Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition, known as 
Izala,10 which has particularly strong connections in Kaduna. Izala was founded in 1978 by Ismail Idriss 
but its salafi-based ideological and theological underpinnings mainly derived from the teachings of 
Idriss’ mentor, Shaykh Abubakar Gumi, a controversial but powerful figure in northern Nigeria in the 
second half of the twentieth century, who made his headquarters in Kaduna city (Ben Amara 2011; 
Marshall 2009).  
The primary aim of Izala was the removal of accretions alien to the Sunna.11 To accomplish 
this it launched fervent and highly public attacks on the Sufi orders and their ‘sacrilegious’ practices. 
These included the treatment of objects as sacred, the custom of worshipping at the shrines of saints, 
and the elevation of living Shaykhs to high positions as the sole qualified mediators between the 
population and Allah. Gumi explicitly categorised the ‘spiritual economy’ of Sufism as based on claims 
of the capacity to deal with magic powers, which he saw as blasphemous and exploitative of the 
credulous. In his eyes, Izala stood for the notion that individuals had the right and indeed the 
obligation to read the holy writings for themselves, make their own reasoned interpretations, and 
take responsibility for their own salvation (Kane 2003: 129-130).  
In addition to theological differences, Izala opposed the hierarchical relationships within 
Sufism through which Shaykhs were viewed as practically divine. It intended to forge a new kind of 
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Muslim - more individualistic and independent, and so willing to limit involvement in the complex 
social web that accompanied Sufism, including the widely extended family. Izala would replace steep 
class hierarchies with more egalitarian relationships (Ben Amara 2011; Marshall 2009).  
This approach is similar to that of the new charismatic churches also established in the late 
1970s. They too saw themselves as returning to a purer version of religion in opposition to the 
missionary orders and as espousing greater democracy, like Izala rejecting social hierarchies including 
those of the mainline churches. While most new churches had their origins in southern Nigeria, 
several of the more influential also have branches in the north, especially Kaduna, which has been a 
centre of charismatic revivalism, owing to its large Christian population and its former status as the 
administrative centre of northern Nigeria. Among the most prominent Pentecostal churches there are 
the Living Faith Church (popularly called Winners Chapel), and the Deeper Life Bible Church/Christian 
Ministry (Ojo 2007). 
Both Izala and the new charismatic churches looked to produce new ideals of personhood and 
individual responsibility in ways that repudiated and battled with the established orders they often 
considered corrupt and even hand-in-hand with the devil and his workings. They wished to cleanse 
religion from negative influences viewed as emanating from both established institutions and local 
cults and rituals. In many ways, echoing the sentiments of the earlier missionaries, this has brought 
them to aim for a complete rupture with these elements of the past (Marshall 2009).  
This engendered considerable hostility, exacerbated by a significant loss of mainline 
congregants to the newer institutions and the conversion of Muslims. In order to combat 
fragmentation within each religion, umbrella organisations were founded - the Christian Association of 
Nigeria (CAN) in 1976 and Jama'at Nasr al-Islam12 (JNI) in 1962 (Kane 2003; Marshall 2009).   
More recently a certain level of unification has resulted from the politicisation of religion, 
producing Muslim-Christian competition for the Nigerian state. This was first explicitly articulated 
during the shari’a debates of the late 1970s and continued in the following decade with disputes over 
Nigerian membership of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (Ben Amar 2011; Loimeier 1997), 
alerting Christians to the importance of uniting to prevent the Nigerian state becoming Islamised.  
This moved the charismatic churches in particular to rethink their previous stance of 
concentrating on individual salvation through prayer and the renunciation of the devil, realising the 
state was too important to leave to the Muslims. The new religious movements started to question 
the very notion of a secular state. Each side wished not merely to control the state but also to banish 
demons and corruption through placing their own religious brethren in charge in order to bring the 
state into line with their ideology. Izala leaders resented the long-standing Sufi domination of the 
state and expressed a wish to impose shari’a law on the north, while the leaders of the larger 
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Pentecostal churches began to campaign for political leaders from their own denominations who 
would purify state institutions (Kane 2003; Kukah 1993; Marshall 2009). 
As a result, while intra-religious friction continues to this day, spurred on by competition over 
souls, it has taken second place to political competition. This has pitted Christians and Muslims against 
one another, heightening the salience of the religious divide and encouraging both intra-religious 
unity and inter-religious conflict.  
Gender in Nigeria 
As stated above, it is my contention that pre-colonial Nigerian cultural groupings did not 
organise according to gender in the sense of a hierarchical system whereby males are categorised as 
inherently superior. They did, however, have socially-constructed differentiation in terms of expected 
roles and behaviour patterns of males and females, with considerable cultural variation in social 
organisation among the disparate peoples. The lack of a biomedically-based understanding of male-
female relationships facilitated a fluid attachment between sexed bodies and social roles. Thus, in a 
number of cultural groups it was accepted that, when required, women could be conceptualised as 
male, men as female. Hence, Ifi Amadiume (1987) explains that among the Igbo, in the absence of a 
son, a daughter could be formally allotted male status and be expected to carry out male-related 
activities, both public and private. Women could be conceptualised as husbands and marry wives, who 
would fulfil the same roles as if married to biological males, bearing children for the lineage through a 
man selected for the purpose. The Igbo term for head of household was not gendered and the 
position could be taken by either sex depending on the situation. In various parts of Africa in the 
absence of appropriate women, male youths could formally become wives for adult men (Carrier and 
Murray 1998).  
Regarding northern Nigeria we have less information about historical power relations among 
Muslim Hausa. While their pre-Muslim forebears did not appear to regard women as inferior 
(Andersson 2002), we know little about what conversion to Islam changed or how male-female 
relations were affected by the early nineteenth century jihad of the Fulani leader Usman Dan Fodio. 
Dan Fodio regarded his daughters very highly; one of them became an important scholar and political 
leader in her own right, training a team of women to reach out and educate others (Mack and Boyd 
2000), despite female seclusion being encouraged for elite Fulani Muslims.  
It was under colonialism that the majority of Hausa converted to Islam and it was then too, in 
great part as a form of political resistance, that lower-class Hausa Muslim women started to be 
routinely secluded as they are today, although this is not as strictly implemented as in the Middle East 
and South Asia (Imam 1994). Seclusion permitted women to avoid back-breaking agricultural labour 
15 
 
 
and afforded them the opportunity to establish their own small businesses. Some apparently 
welcomed this to the extent of converting to Islam to gain these advantages. Muslim law permitted 
them to keep their profits for themselves except in cases of extreme family need, so it was not 
unusual for Muslim women in northern Nigeria to be wealthier than their husbands (Coles 1991; 
Jackson 1985). 
Gender, as the hierarchical concept it now represents (Tamale 2013) was brought to Nigeria in 
the late nineteenth century by western missionaries and colonial officials. It was a crucial element in 
the ‘civilising mission’, the concept used to legitimise European domination of the global south 
(Prevost 2010). Despite clashes over colonial politics (Hansen 1984), church support was deemed 
indispensable for carrying out this mission and nowhere more so than in Sub-Saharan Africa. Here, a 
fundamental aim of both church and colonial state was the inculcation of Europeanised norms of 
gender performance in peoples to whose thinking this was ontologically alien (Amadiume 
1987;Labode 1993; Nzegwu 2006; Oyěwùmí 1997). Besides the notion of inherent male superiority, 
one of the most insidious tenets that accompanied this was the notion of hierarchies of masculinities, 
headed by the form inculcated into the British male elite in their ‘public’ schools. This legitimised the 
notion that white middle-class and elite men should occupy the highest positions in a global hierarchy 
(Sinha 1995).13  
In colonial Nigeria missionaries both acted as role models and inculcated appropriate 
gendered behaviour in line with that of their own backgrounds. One way they did this was by 
differential schooling for boys and girls, in which the former were instructed in academic subjects, the 
latter mainly in housekeeping skills and appropriate female comportment (Labode 1993; Oyěwùmí 
1997).  
This distinction was compounded by the colonial authorities, who made it clear that, despite 
Nigerian women’s major role in production, waged labour was a man’s affair. Educated men were 
offered skilled employment in the civil service and on the railways, while girls’ schooling prepared 
them for domesticity (Lindsay 2007). Christian women were taught their place was to act as 
helpmeets to their husbands; they could not become church leaders in Nigeria, any more than 
elsewhere at that time (Prevost 2010). Since the British openly placed a much higher value on men 
and male activities than on women and female work (Nzegwu 2006), this influenced Nigerians’ own 
perceptions, so their men started to believe in their own superiority. This was enhanced in the post-
colonial setting by white male development practitioners, who influenced cultural groups previously 
little affected by these ideas, including by establishing men as superior in law, for instance, by granting 
them as household heads the right to register land ownership in their names (Rogers 1980). It is thus 
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hardly surprising that today the notion of male superiority has become firmly entrenched in Nigerian 
society as an unalienable and supposedly undisputedly traditional element of gender relations.  
The four foundational elements of contemporary masculinity in Nigeria 
The effect of missionary efforts was not to cause Nigerians to abandon their socially based 
power structures but rather to combine them with aspects of westernised notions of gender 
(Amadiume 1987; Nzegwu 2006; Oyěwùmí 1997). Today, Nigerian society is organised not only along 
gender-power lines but also along lineage- and age-based ones whereby older or senior men hold 
higher power positions than youths and older women retain in practice far more power than the 
Europeanised terminology would suggest. I have called this last tacit power – that is, power not 
expressed in public discourse (Harris 2006, 2012a; see also Jackson 1985; Nzegwu 2006).  
Meanwhile, the ability of men to project appropriate masculine traits has become essential to 
their status and that of their families. A few of these characteristics are particularly crucial, comprising 
what my research has shown to be foundational elements, common to the majority of patrilineal 
social groups I have worked with globally over the past two decades, and quite clearly visible in the 
characteristics of masculinity identified by our project participants in Kaduna (Harris 2011). I am 
suggesting neither that these directly reflect actual practices, although they affect them strongly 
through pressures to conform, nor that they are either inherent in human biology or culturally 
universal. Rather they derive from exposure to similar influences through (neo)colonialism, including 
international development and neoliberal capitalist globalisation, supported by western media. These 
elements are: control over material resources/breadwinning; control over human resources, 
particularly wives/children; virility; and the performance of bravery/protection, very often through 
forms of violence. 
Breadwinning – control over resources 
Largely as a result of the colonial introduction of capitalist ideology, masculinity in Nigeria 
became linked to both control over resources and the obligation to act as the sole provider of 
economic support within the family. Consequently, men were conceptualised as wage earners and the 
ability to earn a living became attached to notions of masculinity even while the majority of men 
never attained this goal, working either as smallholder farmers, along with their wives, or informal 
labourers.  
Although ideologically, superiority is inherent in (adult) men, this is to a large extent 
understood as dependent on their capacity to wield sufficient material resources to satisfy their 
families’ needs. This suggests control over wives and even older offspring is predicated on the ability 
to provide adequately for them. Thus, it is less the dispositional positioning of men as superior and 
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more their ability appropriately to perform provider masculinity that obliges women and children to 
obey their husbands/fathers (Harris 2012a). Therefore, a man unable at least to project the image of 
complying with this ideal may well find himself imbued with less authority than he feels entitled to by 
his positionality, either within the family or the community at large since ‘a man that cannot provide 
for his family is term[ed] as useless in the society’.14 This makes men particularly vulnerable to the 
vagaries of neoliberal market regimes in contemporary society, as we shall see. 
Gender/age positionality and control 
In gerontocratic societies such as Nigeria, age- and gender-based hierarchies intersect, with 
mature men epitomising the ideal masculine position – in control of wives as well as offspring – while 
mature women hold a secondary position – higher than young people of both sexes but lower than 
their husbands. Young women have the lowest status of all while young men occupy an intermediate 
position. As males they should be strong, controlling, and visibly working towards attaining the 
economic capacity to marry and support a family. However, as youths they are expected to show 
subservience to both parents but particularly to fathers (Harris 2012a). 
The legal age of majority might be eighteen but culturally young people are not considered 
adults until they are married with children. This usually requires family support as wedding costs are 
significant, making youths dependent on their fathers to help them marry, and thus emphasising the 
generational aspect of gendered power relations. As long as a father appears likely to be capable of 
financially supporting his sons’ marriages as well as their educational aspirations, the gender/age 
hierarchy may be respected. Fault lines are revealed, however, when older men are clearly unable 
even to provide adequately for daily living expenses, creating a fear these lines may well grow to the 
point that wives stop accepting their husbands’ right of control, something seen as threatening the 
very fabric of society. Today this is considered by men in northern Nigeria as particularly problematic 
because of the important role the capacity to demonstrate such control plays in contemporary claims 
to upholding the Islamically-based morality that has accompanied the introduction of shari’a law 
(Gaudio 2009). Pentecostal Christians also consider the man to be the rightful head of the family 
(Marshall 2009). 
Virility 
A further crucial characteristic of masculinity resides in its relationship to sexuality. As a result 
of European influences, religious and temporal, in Africa masculinity is now conceptualised as 
inseparable from penetration, femininity from the penetrated. This both constructs men as active, as 
opposed to passive women, and simultaneously suggests anyone who allows themselves to be 
penetrated becomes feminised, while penetrators, whether with a flesh-and-blood penis or a penis 
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signifier, are masculinised. Thus, in Africa, as in the global south more generally, deviance from 
appropriate gender-related behaviour is considered particularly problematic in claims to non-
heteronormative identities although scriptural proscriptions also play an important role (Ratele 2011). 
From the ontological perspective of pre-colonial Nigeria these notions would have made no 
sense. Sexual practices in Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole were fluid and not bound up with identity 
claims (Tamale 2013), which are after all relatively recent even in Europe (Foucault 1990). It is likely 
they evolved there because the patriarchal gender ideals that had developed by the mid-nineteenth 
century partially through increasing emphasis on identity differentiation forced those whose practices 
did not accord with the constructions of masculinity and femininity given in the previous paragraph to 
start making claims to specific identities of their own. Thus, the very notion of heteronormativity was 
brought to Africa by Europeans, along with Christianity and colonialism. In Nigeria, as in other British 
colonies, (male) homosexual practices were criminalised by legislation that followed the British law of 
1885 (Long 2003).  
Since virility cannot be demonstrated directly, proxies are used. In Nigeria the two main ones 
are first men’s visible capacity to access multiple (female) sex partners, preferably even for Christian 
men in the form of multiple wives, and secondly numbers of children, particularly sons. Historical 
evidence suggests wealth production in Sub-Saharan Africa depended mainly on the size of the labour 
force, for most consisting entirely of family members, thus, encouraging polygyny (Shaw 2002: 157). 
Despite subsequent material changes, for many this remains strongly associated with men’s status.  
Underlying this all are the assumptions that a real man penetrates (and impregnates) women but also 
that he is able to provide material support for his wives and children. 
Bravery/protection 
In some parts of pre-colonial Nigeria, women could be warriors, demonstrating bravery and 
acting as protectors of their group; however, overall this remained an attribute of younger men 
(Achebe 2005). To be a brave warrior was in many places an important youth aspiration and this is still 
the case, since this group is largely unable to attain any of the three elements previously discussed, 
which are essentially traits of adult men. Today, the performance of violence, whether public, as in 
participation in rebel armies, gangs or riots, or private as within the household, remains one of the 
few ways in which men unable to live up to the previous three elements can claim masculinity.15 
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Failures of the social order  
Religion in Kaduna 
Kaduna has been worse affected by the economic woes described above than many other 
parts of Nigeria, exacerbated by the multiple episodes of violence discussed above. Not only has there 
been no compensation for loss of property but the population movements mentioned have been 
costly in multiple ways, especially the fallout from the suspicion and uncertainty that now surround 
inter-religious relations (Meagher 2013).  
This has been further aggravated by the attempts of the city government, apparently at the 
behest of the Emir of Zaria, to remove indigeneity rights from local Christians, something that 
particularly affects the Gbagyi. As young people reach the age of majority many are no longer able to 
obtain the appropriate certificates, despite their parents and grandparents possessing them (Harris 
2013). This has greatly increased inter-religious tensions, as discussions I held with youths, their 
parents and Christian clergy testified. 
The overall result is that uncertainties and instability remain high, feeding into the need for 
both emotional and material support as well as for answers to the question of the underlying causes 
of these problems. In the past, local cults or rituals would have been the obvious place to look and for 
some this is still the case. However, most of those with whom I spoke preferred to turn to the new 
religious institutions. As Falola suggests:  
the failure of the nation-state and of secular ideologies have enhanced the 
relevance of religion. Religion continues to provide many alternatives to social ills: 
hope that the future will be bright for millions of people traumatized by the failure 
of government; the emotional strength to handle stress; shared identity for the 
hopeless and the marginalized in cities and towns; respect and status within 
missionary hierarchies; and social support for women troubled by poverty, 
childlessness, and spousal abuse. To those who yearn for power or democracy, 
religious organizations provide leadership opportunities in the establishment and 
administration of new branches. Where religion is lucrative, more than a few have 
made a business of it, using their charisma and organizational ability to raise 
money in novel ways (1998: 37). 
The relatively recent founding of Kaduna city meant the Sufi power structures were less 
deeply embedded in the social system there than elsewhere in the north. Moreover, Shaykh Gumi’s 
establishing of his headquarters in the city brought particular prominence to Izala, supported by the 
large and prominent mixed-sex secondary school run by the institution. The consequence has been 
that large numbers of Muslims have joined Izala. 
Meanwhile, a plethora of charismatic churches has sprung up in Kaduna. On each of my visits, 
I saw several new ones. While Deeper Life and other churches of the late 1970s and early 1980s 
focused on ‘holiness’, judging by their billboards many of the more recent ones belong to the 
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prosperity movement - that is, they promise true believers salvation in this world and are adamant it 
can be recognised not only through spiritual power, although this remains important, but also through 
material prosperity. Thus, the simple living advocated by Deeper Life has given way to the display of 
visible symbols of wealth. Prosperity ministers place increasing emphasis on healing the sick but also 
on ‘global spiritual warfare and … personal miracles of deliverance’, hopefully leading to wealth 
(Marshall 2009: 79). Winners Chapel is the most successful representative of this group in Kaduna (Ojo 
2007).  
Men and masculinities in Kaduna 
One consequence of Nigeria’s economic problems has been that significant obstacles have 
been placed in the way of the vast majority of men ever achieving the breadwinner norm, particularly 
the many rural men migrating into the cities, lacking skills or connections to gain formal employment. 
In other words, the introduction under the British of a capitalist-based economy produced the 
correlation between breadwinning and masculinity noted above. The lack of corresponding 
opportunities for waged labour has seemed almost like taunting to Nigerian men, so few have ever 
been able to attain this, in large part because of their country’s position in the global political 
economy. 
Despite their now having the largest GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa,16 Nigerians, especially in the 
north, have remained among the poorest inhabitants of the continent (Teal 2014). The economic 
situation in Kaduna has continued to worsen, significantly limiting access to employment, especially 
for youths (Bununu et al 2015; Harris 2013). In fact, employment opportunities have been steadily 
dwindling, not only for the less educated and unskilled but also for educated and skilled men lacking 
useful connections. This means the majority of the city’s mature male inhabitants have been unable 
fully to live up to the provider role and this is likely to be even harder for their sons.  
The Muslim women in the projects recounted how in the evenings they would wait for their 
husbands to bring home money, provisions, clothes or shoes for the children, as well as household 
supplies. More often than not their menfolk were unable to procure even sufficient food for the day, 
let alone any less crucial items. Since it is believed Islam has tasked men alone with supporting their 
families17 and since Hausa Muslim women are supposed to remain secluded, even the poorest are 
debarred from going out to work. The economic woes of the 1980s had seemed to be going to change 
this (Coles 1991). However, by the mid2000s the less educated women with whom we worked were 
still secluded. Even the widows and divorcees were faced with strong pressures, which few could 
withstand, from neighbours and family members intent on stopping them from taking a job. One 
woman described how the nasty comments flung at her by her neighbours made her daily journey to 
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work a torture but she persisted since she had no other means to ensure her own and her children’s 
survival. This does not, of course, mean no educated Hausa Muslim women in Kaduna hold formal 
jobs, nor that other secluded women do not manage to earn decent money. However, according both 
to our facilitators and our participants, such women remain in the minority and almost none ever 
participated in our projects. 
Seclusion particularly legitimises women’s demands that their husbands live up to their 
provider roles. The project women had taken on board the notion of male superiority, assuming this 
meant their husbands would be fully capable of carrying out their duties, with no more obstacles than 
they themselves met with when they demonstrated their ability to fulfil the obligations of a good 
Hausa wife and mother. They thus felt justified in accusing the men of a failure of manhood in not 
carrying out their part and, according to their own testimony, would do this loudly and aggressively, 
not only in front of the children but at times even more publicly, something apparently quite common 
in Hausaland (Salamone 2007). The humiliated men would in turn become aggressive and might even 
beat their wives. It was bad enough they were failing to perform competently the breadwinning norm 
but to have this publicly exposed meant double humiliation, as it further revealed their inability to 
control their wives, and thus their failure to meet either of the first two elements of masculinity. 
Serious economic hardships were common among these families. The women tried to find 
ways to earn money within the boundaries of their homes. However, since most were not only 
illiterate, but also lacked the skills to produce marketable goods, the main way secluded women can 
generate income, this was not easy. To improve their situation, the project taught them to make 
lotions, soaps and other small items so they could meet some of their personal needs even if they 
could never earn enough to support their families.  
The situation of the Christian women in our projects was little better despite the majority 
having some level of schooling. However, a number of their husbands had been influenced by Hausa 
neighbours into considering female seclusion an appropriate mark of masculinity. They thus refused 
their wives permission to take a job. Other women either lacked appropriate skills or were unable to 
find work. The most they could do was some form of petty trading, so they too started producing and 
selling the items they had learned to make in our project. 
Mature men from both religious groups complained their wives wanted them to be ‘heroes’ 
by bringing home the kind of money only someone with a decent salary could achieve.18 They did not 
appear to realise this myth had been created by their own insistence on their masculine superiority, as 
evidence from the women in our projects demonstrated. This was not, of course, a mere personal 
whim but emanated from the men’s need to live up to social expectations in order not to appear 
emasculated before family and community, while trapped in circumstances that made it impossible to 
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achieve this. The situation appeared particularly difficult for the husbands of our Muslim participants 
with less education and fewer skills than their Christian peers, and with even greater pressure to live 
up to religiously-inspired notions of men as sole providers. They were also more likely to be 
polygynous, to have many children, seclude their wives, and in some cases not to send their daughters 
or even sons to school, thus increasing the likelihood of poverty in the next generation.19  
The young men of both religions with whom the project worked were trying hard to earn 
money to pay their school fees or save for tertiary education. They put great store on this as a path to 
improving their life chances. Most of them desperately wished to attend university although they 
realised they were unlikely to succeed, since not only is there fierce competition, with hundreds of 
applicants for each place, but the costs are prohibitive. 
One consequence of their inability to depend on husbands and fathers to meet family needs 
has been that wives and older sons have started to challenge the men’s power position. Particular 
frictions were exhibited in a group of Christian families who farmed small plots of arable land on the 
outskirts of the city. The fathers expected their sons to provide unpaid labour, which greatly annoyed 
the youths. Finding it awkward directly to confront their fathers, they preferred to vote with their feet 
– after school slipping away to help in the local market or work on the land of another family willing to 
pay them. The effects on the older men have been devastating. Unable to meet all demands for 
economic support, they nevertheless continue to insist on their right to the upper power position – 
that is, to retain the high levels of dispositional power they feel entitled to as mature men (cf. Harris 
2012a).  
Bourdieu suggests those in dominated groups (in this case women and youths) have been 
conditioned to accept such dispositional power as superior and that it would take ‘a radical 
transformation of the social conditions of production’ to change this (Bourdieu 2001: 39, 41-42). 
Things have not quite reached this level yet in Kaduna but change is in the air. Young men in particular 
show themselves unwilling to continue unconditionally to obey a father who can pay neither for their 
schooling nor for their marriage. This is a society in which a man is expected to meet the costs of his 
sons’ weddings, including fees for the officiating clerics and bridewealth. The groom must also provide 
the couple’s home and show himself capable of supporting his wife and future children. In the current 
economic climate this is a major challenge. Muslim girls are likely to have arranged marriages as they 
are not supposed to know any potential suitors. However, their Christian peers did expect to choose 
for themselves and apparently tended to put economic capacity at the top of the list of the qualities 
they sought in a life partner. 
Young men of both religions complained bitterly they were unlikely to be able to marry until 
they were far older than their fathers had been. The Christians were additionally highly critical of the 
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materialism of the girls they were interested in who would not even look at a man unless he had a 
good job or came from an economically well-established family, preferring a polygynous relationship 
with an older man to life in poverty as first wife to a younger one. These issues are particularly 
problematic in this society in which marriage and the production of children comprise the essential 
rite of passage from youth into adulthood (Salamone 2007), suggesting some may never attain the 
latter status. 
Additional pressures arise from the fact that family members in the home village take it for 
grant that their urban relatives have money on which they have a right to draw, making it even more 
difficult for men to meet their daily responsibilities let alone put money aside for future needs.  
Masculinity and religion - symbiotic resources 
While the majority of the Nigerian population is poverty-stricken, the fact that both older 
elites and a small number of newcomers able to position themselves advantageously in the political 
hierarchy have continued to benefit very considerably from the oil money (Falola and Heaton 2008) is 
seen by the population at large as proof they resort to occult powers. The absence of evidence of how 
the wealth was produced has made the riches appear somewhat like manna from heaven or the 
outcome of a pact with the devil (Marshall 2009).  
The conjunction of the authoritarianism of the military governments who ruled most of the 
time from independence to 1999, the fact that too little of the oil money has been used for the 
benefit of the population as a whole, and the considerable violence that has plagued the country over 
the last few decades, has meant that for the majority of urban inhabitants, especially in the north, 
poverty has been compounded by threatening social chaos. This has been exacerbated by a lack of 
investment in agriculture that until the new millennium fuelled rural-urban migration (Teal 2014), thus 
greatly swelling the population of Kaduna and other cities.  
In the absence of alternative forms of support, many have found their biggest solace in 
religion. As previously stated, Nigerians have long been accustomed to looking to the supernatural for 
both cause and cure for the ills that beset them and nowadays this usually means looking to church or 
mosque, and for many to reform Islam or the newer charismatic versions of Christianity. Many see 
these as more relevant for their current needs than what is provided either by the older religious 
institutions or the traditional rituals and cults. First, they offer a clear explanation for the pejorative 
comportment of the government and the elites, as well as for the negative consequences, an 
explanation that fits well with the vision of the world expressed above – a vision of good and evil, with 
corrupt officials seen as sinners under the sway of Satan/Shaitan. A second but very important 
scapegoat is presented in the form of demonization by each side of the other religion, thus 
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legitimising violence against its members (Marshall 2009). Falola describes how some Muslims saw 
Jesus as the devil incarnate, while Christians insisted Muslims performed religious ablutions in 
Christian blood. These opinions are said to represent those of considerable numbers of members of 
each religion and to be an indication of the prevailing regime of symbolic violence in Nigeria, a regime 
that dates back to the time when early Christian missionaries started the practice of vilifying Islam as 
an element in spreading the gospel (Falola 1998:37, 247-248). 
Such unambiguous accounts of the ultimate causes of the poverty and unrest currently 
plaguing Nigeria have been accompanied for both religions by instructions on how individuals can get 
the better of the evils threatening them through defeating their own devils. This includes closer and 
more personal relationships with God/Allah, as well as, for Muslims, the abandoning of local 
accretions that placed Sufi Shaykhs in positions of authority. These new institutions then provide 
congregants with paths to salvation as well as to understanding the world around them. In addition, 
the neediest members usually gain some level of material support, an essential safety net in the form 
of cash and other social benefits, most paid for by tithing/zakat20 from wealthy congregants (Marshall 
2009). 
The older institutions have become concerned as they see their congregations shrinking, as I 
heard from several Anglican priests, including the Archbishop of Kaduna. The Sufi Orders have 
expressed alarm at the influence of more radical groups on youths and have started to offer material 
benefits to their own congregants in the hope of keeping them within the fold, especially the provision 
of free religious education (Hill 2010). 
Izala has become the largest Islamic reform movement in the region. This is in part because of 
the benefits it provides in the way of legitimising personal rights to make individual decisions about 
religious matters and to come to one’s own conclusions about the meaning of the scriptures but also 
because of what it offers the socially marginalised. It has cut through the traditional hierarchies of 
Hausa-Fulani society to treat all as worthy of respect, for instance, by insisting its members not 
continue the practice of kneeling to elders and the powerful. Izala has further helped its members by 
significantly reducing the high prices charged by Sufi Shaykhs for officiating during rites of passage 
such as weddings, funerals, circumcision and baby naming ceremonies. Other economic advantages 
derive from reducing or eliminating bridewealth for marriages within the sect and the strong 
suggestion that members limit themselves to supporting their immediate family members, rather than 
their wider extended family (Kane 2003: 136).  
The neo-Pentecostal churches have approached these issues in much the same way, some 
even going as far as to forbid members to have anything to do with parents or siblings who do not 
belong to the same church, and offering their fellow congregants as a substitute family (Maxwell 
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1998). The prosperity churches additionally promise salvation in the ‘here and now’, a way of dealing 
with the vicissitudes of neoliberalism in which material success becomes synonymous with 
righteousness (Larkin and Meyer 2006; Marshall 2009: 13, 24, 174-5). The belief that poverty and 
misfortune are ultimately the fault of malevolent ancestral spirits still plays a role but these churches 
provide a new path to dealing with this, intended to make rituals and cults irrelevant while boosting 
individual material wealth (Marshall 2009; Maxwell 1998).  
All this helps improve the economic situations of members of both religious movements. 
Doing away with the obligation to provide for everyone with family-related claims, however distant 
the connection, has made it easier for many men not only to meet their wives’ and children’s daily 
requirements but also to save for their sons’ weddings. Lowering officiating costs and getting rid of 
bridewealth has considerably reduced expenses, thus facilitating the marriages of impoverished young 
men such as those our project was working with in Kaduna.   
However, the newer religions impose their own behavioural standards, curtailing the liberties 
of their congregants in various ways.  First, they do not tolerate any resort to traditional rituals. 
Members must follow sect-specific approaches for combating evil. Secondly, they dictate appropriate 
gendered comportment - extra-marital sexual relations are forbidden, as is alcohol consumption. 
There are strict rules about dress, particularly for women. For the Christians, this has meant 
conservative clothing. For instance, Deeper Life in its early days  
forbade its followers to watch television or drink soft drinks such as Coca-Cola. 
Women were told not to straighten or perm their hair, and not to wear jewelry or 
trousers…. [C]onverts were continuously exhorted not to lie, cheat, steal, quarrel, 
gossip, give or take bribes, drink, smoke, fornicate, beat their spouses, lose their 
tempers, or deny assistance to other members in need. Strict dress codes were 
imposed, and limited contact was allowed between the sexes. Marital ﬁdelity was a 
central tenet, and divorce was not sanctioned (Marshall 2009: 71). 
While this might seem limiting, the constraints on male behaviour improved women’s lives, 
significantly reducing levels of domestic violence and enhancing marital relations. From the start of 
the twenty-first century the church somewhat relaxed its severity. For instance, members are now 
permitted to watch suitably edifying television programmes. Although, unlike holiness churches such 
as Deeper Life, the Winners Chapel and other prosperity churches encourage the wearing of 
fashionable clothing and visible signs of wealth, they still expect adherence to strict standards of 
propriety in dress and general comportment (Marshall 2009). 
Under the guidance of Shaykh Gumi, Izala in northern Nigeria has from the beginning 
supported certain emancipatory measures for women, including some measure of freedom from 
seclusion, as long as appropriate dress is worn. Thus, the influence first of Izala and later of shari’a law 
has meant that the vast majority of Muslim women in northern Nigeria now wear an all-covering cloak 
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similar to the Iranian chador (Nasir 2007). Moreover, in the last few years in Kaduna, Saudi influence 
via returning male migrants has started a fashion of wearing niqab, that is, the face veil, in addition to 
hijab.  
Gumi put great stress on women’s education. Illiterate housewives were invited to attend 
Qur’anic schools, in which they did not simply learn to recite the scriptures by rote as in the popular 
Sufi schools but were taught to understand Arabic so they could read and interpret the holy writings 
for themselves. In this way they could join their menfolk in becoming ‘true’ Muslims, taking charge of 
their own religious beliefs and understanding, unlike members of the Sufi orders who rather than 
reading the Qur’an submitted to the authority of the Shaykhs (Ben Amara 2011; Kane 2003; Larkin and 
Meyer 2006). To this end Izala has undertaken mass schooling of women (Kane 2003; Renne 2012). 
Nevertheless, Gumi did not advocate anything like equality. He insisted women and men should be 
segregated as far as possible and the former should limit their participation in public life. While voting 
for women was strongly encouraged, since this was important to keep Muslims in power and Gumi 
also encouraged the founding of a Muslim women’s movement in northern Nigeria (Loimeier 1997: 
169), holding public office was frowned upon. Women had to know their place and above all they 
should not aspire to behave like western women and demand equal rights (Kane 2003: 142).  My 
discussions with Izala Imams suggested such attitudes persisted. Some, for instance, require their 
wives to cover face, hands, and feet in public, leaving only their eyes visible. 
The charismatic churches are little more relaxed in relation to women. They admit them to 
some leadership positions but generally keep them in second place. In effect, both reform mosques 
and Pentecostal churches encourage women to play active roles while simultaneously promoting 
masculine superiority. Thus, women’s higher profile and greater opportunities in their places of 
worship come at the cost of expectations of submission to male authority (Marshall 2009).   
Both religions seem to hold special appeal for young urban men who feel themselves 
marginalised, particularly but not only the more educated. Many project youths had been raised in 
one of the newer sects/denominations but some had enlisted in their own right. Izala and many 
Pentecostal churches uphold generational power only for young people whose parents are also 
members since only their own members count as true believers and they see no reason why youths 
should obey sinners. Nevertheless, men old and young can console themselves with the fact that 
women are kept firmly in their place; they may have to be treated with respect but they are also 
required to subordinate themselves to their menfolk. Men’s power position is bolstered by taking a 
wife from the same congregation who is virtually guaranteed to behave appropriately, while young 
women are discouraged from putting wealth in a marriage partner above godliness, accordingly 
increasing young men’s chances of marriage. Weakening the authority of the older generations also 
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supports youths to adopt more individualistic lifestyles (Kane 2003; Marshall 2009). Thus, the newer 
religious establishments go some way to help men conform to the first two foundational traits of 
masculinity, albeit with somewhat flattened-out gerontocratic elements.  
The newer religious movements have attacked some of the premises on which the third 
element of masculinity, virility, has historically been based, most especially multiple sex partners, 
which the neo-Pentecostals in particular frown upon. Perhaps a show of strong antipathy to non-
heteronormative practices is a way to provide a substitute by demonstrating an appropriate approach 
to sexuality. Whether or not for this reason, the populace appears strongly to support the position 
both of their religious establishments and the Nigerian government that homosexuality is evil and 
destructive of the social order. After all, it threatens the third element of masculinity (Ratele 2011) 
and is a major sin for both Christianity and Islam. Taking advantage of the fears that many feel as a 
result of these, governments have found it a very useful scapegoat for deflecting attention from their 
own failings or ramping up popularity at election time (Tamale 2013).  
This is exacerbated by the association on the part of the religious institutions of non-
normative sexualities with witchcraft and demons. As a result of this and the introduction of shari’a 
law, groups in northern Nigeria who are indeterminately sexed and/or gendered, in particular the Yan 
Daudu of Kano with a long historical presence much like that of the hijra of South Asia, have in recent 
years found themselves the butt of violent treatment (Gaudio 2009). 
Efforts to clean up aberrant sexual presentation are regarded as important components of the 
narrowing of the performance of (religiously sanctioned) norms that are helping to preserve 
masculine superiority and so to ward off the social chaos it is felt would ensue should more egalitarian 
relations be generally adopted. In this way the new religious establishments have taken over much of 
the function of the state in keeping society running and so are in line with the current ideology of 
reducing state responsibilities. This is all the more important because the complementary effect of 
neoliberal economic relations is to widen the gap between the haves and the have-nots while 
encouraging the wealthy to renounce obligations towards the welfare of others, through the ideology 
of individual responsibility. This is counteracted by the newer churches and mosques by placing 
special onus on their wealthy members to donate a relatively small proportion of their wealth to the 
impoverished in their congregations, while removing the seemingly endless requirements for even the 
poor to provide support to all who can claim family ties (Kane 2003; Marshall 2009). 
That the end of the pretence that the capitalist system was ever going to produce decent jobs 
for all has not been accompanied by social collapse is said by many of those with whom I spoke in 
Kaduna to be due to the preservation of the gender system bolstered by religion. This combination 
has gone a considerable way to support a social order that depends on men’s capacity to retain the 
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superior position to which masculinity supposedly entitles them, in large part by controlling the 
behaviour of other family members. To ensure the maintenance of this order, male household heads 
who fail to keep control within their own families are threatened with emasculation. In such ways 
does the gender system support governmentality.  
The fourth foundational element of masculinity - bravery/protection – is also reinforced by 
the new religious institutions, at least in Kaduna, through their demonization of the other religion. It 
has been not uncommon, particularly when frictions between the two faiths are on the increase, for 
clerics on both sides to preach hatred in their weekly sermons (Marshall 2009: 230). This was 
periodically remarked upon during my time in Kaduna and was said to have been a significant element 
in encouraging congregants to participate in riots, along with pressures related to masculinity, since it 
was the duty of a ‘real man’ to provide protection for his own cultural grouping when appropriate, 
through participating in public acts of violence (Harris 2012b: 228). Finally, to dedicate oneself to 
fighting the Lord’s wars is a crucial element of the newer movements for both religions (Marshall 
2009).   
Conclusion 
The new forms of Islam and Christianity discussed in this paper arose as responses to the 
same social and economic challenges. While both seek to purify religion in specific ways, this is not 
about returning to the past but rather concerns putting into practice ideas corresponding to the needs 
of contemporary life at a time of disillusionment with the notion of a secular state. Each religious 
movement offers a promise that under their particular umbrella corruption will vanish and the state 
will uphold justice and piety. This brings them into competition with one another, particularly in 
northern Nigeria, encouraging mutual demonization and even physical violence (Larkin and Meyer 
2006; Marshall 2009). 
However, this is not simply a matter of the material. These establishments feed into local 
beliefs that ultimate causes reside in the realm of the supernatural and find new ways of harnessing 
these beliefs into structures in which sin is a matter of individuals taking personal responsibility for 
their own righteousness rather than depending on the intercession of religious leaders (Kane 2003; 
Marshall 2009).  
The capitalist system is so organised that social stability has come to depend in the first place 
on the majority of families having access to sustainable, decently paid employment, sufficient to allow 
them to live secure lives. As neoliberalism has ended the dream that this might someday be attainable 
in Nigeria, masculinity and religion have come to be crucial resources for sustaining social order not 
just for the men of Kaduna but for their families too. 
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The symbiotic relationship of masculinity and Christianity was made clear in Nigeria by their 
simultaneous introduction under European missionary regimes.21 The influence first of the colonial 
setting, and more recently of the international networks to which the newer religious establishments 
belong has further affected the development of masculinity, enforcing modest dress for women, and 
legitimising their subordinate status.  
Today, the capacity appropriately to perform the foundational elements of masculinity has 
become tightly connected to the precepts of the new religious establishments. They provide a 
legitimate and ethically founded basis for their congregants to improve their own particular situations 
by acting independently of traditional social structures, thus boosting not only their finances but also 
their capacity to provide and so their masculinity. It is this conjunction of masculinity and religion that 
is helping to preserve social order in Kaduna and ward off the chaos it is feared would arise should it 
fall apart.  
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Notes 
1
 Thanks to Dorothea Schulz, Marloes Jansen, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on 
an earlier draft. 
2 Kaduna city is the capital of the state of the same name. In this paper, Kaduna without qualification 
will be used to refer to the city.  
3 ‘A bill for an Act to prohibit and punish public nudity, sexual intimidation and other related 
offences in Nigeria’, introduced in the senate in 2007 but never passed, is popularly known as the 
nudity bill (Bakare-Yusuf 2011: 117). 
4 From 2007-2008 the projects were sponsored by the DfID-funded Citizenship Development 
Research Centre run by the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex and from 2008-2011 by the 
AHRC/ESRC-funded Religion and Society Programme run by the University of Lancaster. 
5 For more details on project participants see Harris (2013: 285). 
6 For more details on Kaduna city see Harris (2013). 
7 Participants in a round table chaired by Mohammadu Buhari, now President of Nigeria, alleged 
politicians gave unemployed youths money, weapons and drugs to organise sectarian violence 
(Bobboyi and Yakubu 2005: 211ff). 
8 Now expanded as Evangelical Church Winning All. 
9 Islamism principally focuses on founding a religiously-based state, such as Iran, while reform Islam 
emphasises individual reformation through personal interpretation of the scriptures (Kane 2003). 
10 Its full Hausa name is Jama’at izalat al bid a wa iqamat al-sunna.  
11 Sunna comprises the Qur’an, Hadith and other teachings of the Prophet (Kane 2003). 
12 The Society for the Victory of Islam. 
13 Hereby providing a rationale for racism. 
14 From gender traits by Christian youths in Kaduna. 
15 Gambling and alcohol consumption are other ways not addressed in the present paper. Having 
multiple sex partners is another but in Kaduna the youths I worked with claimed it was mainly 
married men who had multiple relationships. 
16 https://knoema.com/IMFWEO2016Apr/imf-world-economic-outlook-weo-april-2016 [Accessed 
15.6.2016].  
17 Aligning contemporary understanding of Islam with capitalist ideology. 
18 Personal communication from Maji Peterx of the NGO Carefronting, reporting on group 
discussions with men on their roles in family life in conjunction with one of his NGO’s projects. 
19 Further evidence regarding this propensity, albeit in a rural part of Kaduna State, can be 
found in Adiri et al (2010). 
20 The giving of alms to the poor. 
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21 This would seem also to have considerably influenced the development of masculinity 
among Nigerian Muslims but more research is needed into how Islam affected male-female 
behaviour patterns in pre-colonial, pre-Christian Sub-Saharan Africa. 
